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Although I’ve been asked to revisit Homo Aestheticus, my second book, I 
will begin by describing the laborious and uneven emergence of its 
predecessor, What Is Art For?, which was published four years earlier, in 
1988. I began writing it when I was a housewife in Sri Lanka, in the 
middle 1970s. I had some ideas and wanted to see where they would go. 
Writing was a way of finding out. 
 And write I did, over and over, over years and miles. I added to the 
book in 1977-78 in Oxford, where I had a six-month fellowship to do 
nothing but read in the Bodleian Library. Later versions ensued in 1978-
79 in Nigeria, and in Papua New Guinea between 1982-84. 
 Finding a publisher took more than five years. These were pre-email 
days, necessitating intercontinental airmail letters that took as long as 
three weeks each way to reach their destination. And publishers are not 
known for prompt replies. I found myself waiting as impatiently for the 
mailman each day as Radha and other women in Indian miniature 
paintings waited for their lover. 
 Most publishers whom I queried did not even want to see the book. 
One editor looked at the manuscript and asked me to cut it by about a 
third. I obliged, but she could not obtain strong enough 
recommendations from readers and, after eighteen months of hope and 
dread, turned it down. Devastated, I put the careworn pages away for a 
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year and then rewrote it yet again, this time in Papua New Guinea. 
Finally, Naomi Pascal, the Editor-in-Chief at the University of 
Washington Press, took a chance and accepted a first book by an 
unknown and academically unaffiliated author. She phoned me with the 
good news on Hallowe’en 1985. Still, even after that, my production 
editor became ill and the book appeared only in April 1988, thirteen years 
after I first began to write it. 
 Some reviewers of What Is Art For? pointed out that most of the 
references were from the 1970s and earlier. There was good reason for 
that. Apart from the months in Oxford, I was dependent on what I could 
find in “Third World” university libraries (even though the anthropology 
collections at the University of Ibadan and the University of Papua New 
Guinea were superb and up to date). I had no colleagues from whom to 
learn about new research and ideas. In fact, none of my Sri Lankan 
friends or associates suspected that I was a closet academic, secretly 
writing a scholarly book. 
 Although What Is Art For? did surprisingly well for an academic 
book by a nobody (it has to date had five paperback printings), its yearly 
sales have now been surpassed by Homo Aestheticus, whose genesis and 
gestation were far different. During the 30 months that What is Art For? 
was in production, I had amassed material for a second book and had 
begun to write it. I was leading an academic life in the United States, 
teaching at the New School and attending anthropology seminars at New 
York University. I had an introduction to an editor at the Free Press, who 
not only accepted an unfinished manuscript but gave me a small 
advance.  Publication took only six months. 
 I feel very maternally fond of and protective about the begetting, 
birth, and personality of both books. If Homo Aestheticus benefited from 
my familiarity with contemporary scholarship, What is Art For? has the 
kind of freshness and enthusiasm of someone who is trying to formulate 
a new discourse on her own. Although my ideas continue to develop, I do 
not wish to apologize for anything in either book, as each is of its time 
and very much connected to my place in the world when I produced 
them. (Both, incidentally, were written and rewritten on manual portable 
typewriters). 
 There are terms in Homo Aestheticus that are problematic, but I have 
not found solutions to the problems. 
 First, the title. My working title had been Deep Art (“deep” in several 
senses: deep in evolutionary time, deep in our biological nature, deep as 
being of profound importance in human lives). But my editor said that 
title wouldn’t do. He wanted to call the book The Aesthetic Ape unless I 
could come up in three days with something he liked better. I desperately 
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and unavailingly ransacked books of poetry and Bartlett’s Quotations. 
Finally, the night before the deadline, “Homo Aestheticus” came into my 
head. The editor liked it, and his boss, the director of the press, added the 
subtitle: “Where Art Comes From and Why.” 
 A few years later, Arthur Danto pointed out to me that “the aesthetic 
human” is not really what the book is about. It is concerned with humans 
as art makers, not appreciators of art’s aesthetic qualities. Had I known 
Latin better, I should have titled the book Homo Artifex, although some 
readers might not have thought it was about art at all (as they seem to do 
with “Aestheticus”) but perhaps about bones or sports equipment or 
rubber. Even though the title is, strictly speaking, inaccurate, very few of 
my readers apparently realize it. Only Danto has ever mentioned it. 
 Two other terms are ones I devised for the book and have not used 
since, “species-centric” (Chapter 1) and dromena (Chapter 4). With regard 
to the latter, I wanted to find a term that sounded more serious or 
academic than “doing something” or “something that is done,” and went 
again to a classical language, this time Greek. “Species-centric” was a 
term I coined, opposing it to self-centric or ethnocentric—-terms that 
judge others as different from (usually inferior to) oneself or people of 
one’s own kind. To me, it seemed a positive term, recognizing that all 
human beings belong to one species, and therefore we are all more alike 
than different. Since then, I’ve learned that animal rights advocates use 
the same term to mean the mental or moral elevation of one’s own 
species, implying that members of other species are inferior so that we 
can kill or eat or experiment on them with impunity. That is certainly not 
what I meant by the term. 
 The biggest terminology problem is, however, with the phrase 
“making special,” the subject of Chapter 3 and the chapter that has been 
reproduced in this volume of the Journal of the Canadian Association for 
Curriculum Studies.  I heartily wish that there were a better term. I have 
tried alternatives—”making the ordinary extraordinary,” “elaborating,” 
“artifying”—but none of these seems to communicate what I mean or 
why I think the concept is important. 
 Two oversimplifications of “making special” have dogged me from 
the beginning. The first is made by people (the “Softmindeds”) who love 
the term and uncritically apply it in a sentimental sort of way to almost 
anything. I think they trivialize it. The second group (the “Hardheadeds”) 
find the word “special” to be wishywashy, and they point out to me that 
with that word I am including the black and white striped uniforms of 
convicts, the yellow stars that were worn by Jews in Western Europe, and 
other such examples. “That’s not art,” they say. In Homo Aestheticus, I try 
to differentiate my use of the phrase from both the unrigorous application 
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to everything and the rigorous application of it to obvious non-art. In Art 
and Intimacy and subsequent articles, I “operationalize” the term as to 
what actions make something special. All this does no good. People go on 
loving or snidely dismissing the term for the same reason: its apparent 
wide applicability. 
 I don’t define art as “making special,” but in the simplest sense, I do 
think making special characterizes what artists of all kinds do. Even 
more, it describes a common trait that, in a Darwinian sense, is a 
noteworthy feature of human nature. My concern is to emphasize a 
simple observation that evolutionary biologists tend to overlook: that 
humans sometimes are not content to leave ordinary reality alone. Take 
skin, for instance: it is tattooed, pierced, painted. The same for ordinary 
hair: it is cut, combed, braided, feathered so that it will look different 
from its natural state. Other creatures do not do this. Then there are our 
Paleolithic ancestors who painted on cave walls and made them unlike 
ordinary cave walls. Instead of saying, trivially, “Gee, we need to  find an 
animal to kill today,” people whose subsistence relies on hunting perform 
ceremonies in which words are made different from ordinary language—
rhymed, inverted, repeated, and otherwise made unlike usual spoken 
utterances. Ditto with ordinary bodily movement and dance, with 
ordinary vocal prosody and song. 
 I think this penchant in humans needs to be noticed, first, and then 
explained. Why don’t we simply leave things as they are?  Archaeologists 
recognize that at some point in their evolution, humans began to make 
and use symbols. Symbolizing is considered to be a watershed in 
cognitive ability and “art” is often automatically considered to be a subset 
of symbolizing. 
 Yet, I think this is incorrect. Symbols in themselves need not be 
special, or artful, at all. Think of a symbolic mark scratched on a piece of 
paper, or on a blackboard. X marks a spot, and it is a cognitive 
achievement to place a hand-print on a wall, blow pigment around it, and 
make an image of a hand: “I was here!” 
 Handprints are generally considered to be “art,” but not because 
they are symbols. Paleolithic handprints are found in special (unusual) 
locations (deep underground) and are usually placed with regard to other 
marks on the wall. Another example is cicatrization, which in some parts 
of the world “symbolizes” adulthood. Although it should be enough just 
to slash the body any old way (pain is pain), the marks are invariably 
patterned. 
 Nearly all artists I talk to know what I mean by “making special.” It 
is what they do with materials and ideas (or tones, meters, movements, 
words, plots). I know artists who seem to make everything in their lives 
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special or considered, even the way they address an envelope or arrange 
food on their plate. In some societies (Bali comes to mind), ordinary 
people make things special all the time. 
 I think it is important to realize that there is this unusual but 
elementary fact about humans: when they care about something they are 
generally inclined to make it special. This is not to identify it (like yellow 
stars) or to indicate that it is specific (like a ribbon over auditorium seats 
reserved for distinguished guests)—but to show that one cares about it: 
“This treatment surpasses what is common or usual, because it has 
emotional relevance to me.” I claim that it is an evolved feature of human 
psychology that when we care, we make special. Some may think of this 
activity as art. 
 It is helpful and important when we are thinking about the arts, or 
teaching or doing them, to realize that we are engaging in a human 
proclivity that has characterized our species for hundreds of thousands of 
generations. Making special is not being special, but is doing what 
humans naturally are inclined to do. If art seems unusual or rare today, it 
is because of many intertwined changes in the ways we live and in the 
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